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Abstract
To keep elder employees in the labour force, introducing age-dependent job
conditions can be a policy measure. However, we know little about the effect
of such initiatives. We investigate the effects of a particular programme in Nor-
way that reduces the workload of teachers at age 55 but maintains the same
wage. Evaluation of this programme is well suited to a difference-in-difference
analysis, where the control group is teachers slightly too young to be eligible
for the workload reduction. Using full population register data for the period
2006–2013, we analyse the effects of the programme on health as indicated by
sickness absence and health care utilization. We find that whereas there is no
effect among women, the workload reduction causes a decrease in sickness
absence and an improvement in mental health among males. These results,
which are robust to a placebo test, to extending the pretreatment period, and
to dropping single birth cohorts, are driven by a subgroup of men whose prior
health status is poor.
KEYWORD S
absenteeism, aging, health, sickness absence, working conditions, work intensity, workload
J E L C LA S S I F I C A T I ON
I18; J14; J22
1 | INTRODUCTION
Achieving increased labour market activity of older individuals has been high on the political agenda for several years,
with the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) noting that population aging is one of the
most important challenges facing its members. An older society may place a rising economic burden on the working-
age population, put public finances under heavy pressures, and reduce growth in living standards (OECD, 2006). This
concern motivates policies for retaining employed workers in the labour force, including measures to improve working
life conditions of older employees. The current analysis investigates the causal effect of such a preventive initiative,
being the reduction in workload given to teachers in Norway at the age of 55, that is, 7 years before they have the
option of early retirement. This age is of great interest when measuring the potential for active and healthy aging, as
demonstrated by the Active Aging Index, developed by United Nations' Commission for Europe and the European
Commission. We analyse the intention-to-treat effect of a negotiated workload reduction on sickness absence and
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health, exploiting the fact that employees only a year or less apart in age face different workload demands in the same
period.
In Norway, teaching requirements are set in nationwide agreements between teachers' unions and their counter-
part. The intention behind the initiative analysed, introduced in 2006, was to relieve older teachers of some workload
by reducing the number of lessons per week by 5.8% (Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities, 2006).
The workload reduction affected teachers in primary, lower secondary, and upper secondary schools. All teachers of
the relevant age have the same percentage reduction in workload, irrespective of union membership, the subject taught,
grade, and school level, whereas contracted hours and labour income was not affected. Further details on the initiative
are found in Section 2.4.
An implicit premise of this initiative is that health deteriorates with age, implying lower productivity. In health eco-
nomics theory, the development of health over the life cycle is a key issue. Within the classical model of Grossman
(1972), eternal life is possible, if the health deterioration that comes with age is outweighed by health production from
market and nonmarket goods (e.g., medical care and exercise, respectively). Labour is then primarily a source of
income, although it also gives less room for leisure that is an important health production input. Extending on this
model, Muurinen and Le Grand (1985) argue that when generating earnings, workers with low human and/or financial
capital are constrained in their choices and may therefore prefer to substitute health for wealth, which would imply
that the health of poorer and less educated workers would deteriorate more rapidly. This is also the prediction from
Case and Deaton's model, given that perfect health repair is impossible (Case & Deaton, 2005).
Empirically, it is difficult to distinguish between the health effect of workload (job intensity), other work conditions
such as job injury risk, or hours worked. For instance, in a boom or following a reform of the standard work week, it is
plausible that both hours worked and workload will change, and income is typically affected. The bulk of the existing
literature does not aim at making such a distinction. A recent example is the work by Cygan-Rehm and Wunder (2018),
who note that due to data limitations, their estimated effect of an extra hour's work time is a “total effect,” that is, it
“incorporates any potential channels through which increased working time might affect health such as, e.g., changes
in worker's tasks and pressure at work.”
In the literature that specifically investigates the relationship between working conditions and health, the working
conditions studied are rather diverse but can be categorized as physical demands and psychosocial risk factors (for a
recent overview, see Defebvre, 2018). Most related to our work are the analyses studying the impact of psychosocial fac-
tors. Using retrospective panel data, Defebvre (2018) analyses the effect of treatment based on self-declared exposure to
a set of various psychosocial risk factors. He concludes that such exposure—separately or combined with physical
demands—is associated with a higher number of self-declared chronic diseases (Defebvre, 2018). Cottini and Lucifora
(2013) find that high work intensity (working at very high speed with tight deadlines at least half of the time) has
adverse effects on mental health, after controlling for a number of other work conditions and long work hours. Their
study uses repeated cross-sectional survey data (Cottini & Lucifora, 2013).
In the bulk of the literature on workload and health, health is proxied by self-reported health. An exception is the
work by Ose (2005), who applies sickness absence as a proxy for health. There have been diverging views on sickness
absence as a global indicator of health. Kivimäki et al. (2003) conclude that medically certified sickness absence can be
used as a measure of ill health in working populations. However, this literature also recognizes that sickness absence
can be related to factors other than health. Absence can also be used as an indicator of effort (Hesselius, Nilsson, &
Johansson, 2009) and is reduced when job environments become less secure (Bratberg & Monstad, 2015;Arai &
Thoursie, 2005; Ichino & Riphahn, 2005). In this analysis, we study use of health care (general practitioner [GP] visits)
as well as the effect on certified sickness absence.
In general, analyses of the relationship between workload and health are faced by several endogeneity concerns.
First, the choice of education and occupation, and the hiring of employees, is likely to be related to individual health.
Next, health-related exits from the labour force may bias effect estimates downwards (the so-called “Healthy worker
effect”). Our research design implicitly addresses these sources of selection bias. We study one occupation and a sample
of employees who are still working, at approximately the same age. The assignment of treatment depends on month of
birth within a narrow age window, that is, exogenous to individual health. Furthermore, the analysis benefits from
panel data that enable us to apply a difference-in-difference (DD) approach and the fixed effects estimator to control for
time-constant unobserved heterogeneity. Finally, using administrative registry data, we avoid problems of recall or jus-
tification biases, which is a concern in surveys of self-reported health.
Therefore, the main contribution of our analysis is that we address the endogeneity of workload with respect to
individual health and isolate the effect of workload from the effect of income and working hours. Employees receive
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full compensation in terms of income with the change in workload, and the initiative/programme does not affect
hours worked. We find some indications that the workload reduction causes a decrease in sickness absence and an
improvement in mental health among males. A subgroup of men, whose prior health status is poor, experience a
considerable health improvement in terms of certified sickness absence and GP visits for mental health problems.
Among women, sickness absence is unaffected, but women of poor pretreatment health have fewer GP visits for
cardiovascular problems.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some institutional background on the Norwegian labour market
in general and the education sector in particular. Section 3 presents our empirical strategy and Section 4 the requisite
data. Section 5 details our results and provides several robustness checks. Section 6 concludes.
2 | INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
2.1 | Sickness insurance
In Norway, sickness insurance is mandatory and regulated by law, covering all employees who have been with the
same employer for at least 2 weeks, with a 100% replacement rate from the first day. A medical certificate is required
for spells of absence of more than 3 or 8 days, depending on whether the employer has signed the Tripartite Agreement
on a more inclusive working life (“IA Agreement”) or not. The first 16 days of absence are paid by the employer (the
employer period), whereas the remaining period is paid by social insurance. The maximum period of benefits is 1 year,
including the employer period. The level of sickness absence is high, particularly among women (Markussen, Røed,
Røgeberg, & Gaure, 2011).
Unlike many countries where long-term unemployment precedes early retirement, in Norway the early retirement
pathway is typically via health-related benefits, that is, long-term sickness absence followed by disability benefits
(OECD, 2013). Therefore, a reduction in sickness absence is the subject of much political attention.
2.2 | Health care sector
Norway's health care system is characterized by mandatory health insurance and is largely financed by general taxes.
Patients' out-of-pocket payments are in practice very low due to a tight annual expenditure cap. All individuals may list
with a GP. Administrative registers for remuneration of GPs are an important source for research on health care utiliza-
tion both at the individual and population level.
2.3 | Norwegian labour market
At the national level, the primary policy measures to retain older workers in the workforce are the following. First, a
2011 pension reform provides workers with incentives to stay at work longer. It primarily affects private sector workers
and cohorts born after 1953, whereas public sector workers born 1954 and later will be gradually affected because their
pension will be subject to new indexation rules and life-expectancy adjustments (OECD, 2013). Second, the IA
Agreement, which was launched in 2001 and has been extended several times since, is intended to promote initiatives
at the company level. Lastly, by law, workers aged 60 years and above are entitled to 1 week extra holiday, irrespective
of sector or industry.
2.4 | The treatment
In the 2006 agreement between Union of Education Norway and The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional
Authorities, it is made explicit that the initiative should result in a workload reduction for teachers who pass a certain
age threshold. Although the local employer (school) might assign these teachers “other pedagogical tasks,” for instance
mentoring younger colleagues, the reduction in lessons should not be outweighed by an increase in other tasks and
duties (The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities, 2006). The age threshold is such that, in a given
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school year, teachers whose 55th birthday is before December 31 will receive a 5.8% reduction in teaching require-
ments, whereas their slightly younger colleagues, who turn 55 during the school year, but after December 31, will not.
Teaching requirements differ by subject and school level (the required number of lessons per week ranges from
26 in primary school to 16.4 for a few subjects in upper secondary). Given that all teachers of the relevant age have the
same percentage reduction in workload, it amounts to 1 to 1.5 fewer lessons per week. (Teachers have other duties
besides giving lessons. It is stipulated that classroom teaching and tasks directly linked to it, such as preparation and
correcting homework and tests, amounts to 67% of contracted hours (Union of Education Norway, 2012).
The education sector is dominated by public schools. Teachers' employers (municipalities for primary schools and
lower secondary and counties for upper secondary) have essentially the same senior policy towards teachers as towards
other employees, with the exception of workload regulations. The workload reduction at age 55 is quantifiable and stan-
dard across the public education sector. It is also easy to communicate, and there is no income loss; hence, there is
every reason to consider that the uptake would be high. In principle, a teacher may turn down the option of reduced
workload if he/she prefers teaching the same number of lessons as before rather than potentially being assigned addi-
tional “pedagogical tasks.” However, the wage income is the same whether the option is accepted or not (for a given
number of contracted hours).
The workload reduction can affect health and sickness absence in several ways. A less stressful work situation
should in itself be health improving. In addition to this direct health effect, workers may interpret the workload reduc-
tion as an acknowledgement of greater job demands, and workers who consider that they are treated well (given a
workload reduction) respond with having less sickness absence (Fehr & Gächter, 2000). Following the same logic, their
colleagues who have to wait another year to receive the same workload reduction could respond by increasing their
sickness absence, in which case the effect would be underestimated.
3 | EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
The challenges to estimating causal impacts of policy measures are well known. Unless assignment to a treatment, D, is
independent of the potential outcomes, a plain comparison of treated and untreated units typically will be biased
because it mixes up the treatment effect with selection to treatment. With repeated observations, the problem is allevi-
ated: instead of assuming that potential outcomes are statistically independent of the treatment, it suffices that in
absence of treatment, treated and untreated follow a common trend. Formally, with treatment in t,









where Y0 denotes the untreated outcome. This is the identifying assumption for DD methods.
The design of the workload reduction agreement makes it well suited for evaluation with DD. The Norwegian
school year starts in mid-August and ends in late June. In the beginning of the school year, teaching plans are made
where teachers are allocated to classes and courses. The plan takes into account whether teachers are entitled to the
age-contingent workload reduction during the school year. Notably, only teachers whose 55th birthday is before
December 31 receive the reduction, whereas colleagues who turn 55 during the school year but after December 31, do
not. Having been born in the last (treated) rather than the first (controls) part of the year therefore acts as a natural
experiment available for a DD strategy. By design, the estimated effects of this experiment relates to the first (school)
year of treatment because in later years, both the treatment and the control groups are eligible for the workload
reduction. Because we do not observe the actual workload of each individual teacher, the estimated effects should be
interpreted as intention-to-treat effect estimates.
In what follows, t denotes the school year that begins in t (i.e., t = 2007 refers to the school year 2007–2008). For
school year t, the treatment group includes teachers who turn 55 before New Year's Eve (for t = 2007, those who are
born July–December 1952). The control group consists of teachers whose 55th birthday is in school year t, but after
December 31 (those who are born January–June 1953 for t = 2007).
We apply a standard regression DD where Yit denotes the outcome of teacher i, who turns 55 in school year t. The
dummy variable D indicates the treatment group. Another dummy, T, equals 1 in the treatment year and 0 in the year
before the treatment year, that is, the school year when the teacher turns 54. In the estimated equation presented
below, the coefficient β1 captures the effect of getting 1 year older in the control group. Because we pool several school
years, we also include year fixed effects, γt. Finally, individual fixed effects, γi, are included to pick up age effects within
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a birth cohort and other individual heterogeneity. The individual fixed effects also include the pretreatment difference
between the treated and control group. Then, the DD estimator is δ in
Yit = β0 + β1Tt + δ Di ×Ttð Þ+ γi + γt + uit, ð2Þ
and the equation is estimated gender-wise by the within groups (fixed effect) estimator with standard errors clustered
at the individual level.
By restricting the analysis to teachers born in July–December in t – 55 (treated) and January–June t – 54 (controls),
we obtain a control group that is quite close to the treatment group—on average 6 months younger. Moreover, the
treated and controls are homogenous in education and occupation. These facts are in favour of the common trend
assumption, which is also checked by a placebo test and by extending the regression equation with more years before
treatment.
As discussed in more detail below, the first calendar year with available data is 2006, and the last is 2014. Thus, the
first school year of treatment (T = 1) is 2007/2008, with T = 0 in 2006/2007. The oldest treatment cohort is born in




The key data source is the FD-Trygd database, which links administrative information from the Norwegian Labour and
Welfare Administration and Statistics Norway. This database covers all Norwegians from 1992 onwards and provides
information on gender, month, and year of birth, along with detailed information on certified sick leave covered by
social insurance (start and stop dates), disability, work history (date of job entry and exit, sector, industry, occupation,
and contracted hours), and the level and type of education, and so forth.
For the purpose of this project, data from FD-Trygd was merged with an administrative dataset containing individ-
ual level health information available from 2006 onwards. The Norway Control and Payment of Health Reimbursement
register holds information on all invoices sent by GPs for remuneration, that is, for each patient contact (consultation),
whether at the GP's regular office or at an emergency centre. At each consultation, the GP records a diagnosis according
to the International Classification of Primary Care, Second edition classification. For each consultation, we also know
whether a sickness certificate was issued.
4.2 | Outcomes
We consider several outcomes, related to a school year. The Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration data con-
tains information on sickness absence remunerated to employers from National Insurance. These are episodes that last
at least 16 days, but the data provides information on the full duration of an episode, including the part paid by
employers. We use this information to define the variable sickdays measuring mean absence days per month. From the
Norway Control and Payment of Health Reimbursement data, we obtain GP visits (per year) and sick notes, indicating
the number of sickness certificates issued per year. The sick notes variable tells whether a sickness certificate was
issued, not the duration of absence. We also define three variables related to the diagnosis recorded at the visit; psychi-
atric (P), musculoskeletal (L), and cardiological (K), that is, diagnoses within International Classification of Primary
Care, Second edition Chapters P, L, or K, respectively. The former two represent the most frequent illnesses identified
in certified sickness absence, whereas the latter represents potentially serious impairments. Each variable measures the
number of occurrences per year.
4.3 | Sample
For each school year starting 2007–2013, we identify teachers born in July–December in t – 55 (treatment group) or in
January–June in (t + 1) – 55 (control group). The population of teachers is defined based on information about indus-
try, sector, education, and (where possible) occupation. Within the relevant industries (school levels), we restrict the
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sample to individuals whose level of education is compatible with teaching at that level. For instance, to be qualified as
a teacher at upper secondary, academic track, 1 year of study at a university or university college is required (Sjaastad,
Carlsten, Wollscheid, Reiling, & Federici, 2016). As the workload reduction draws on specific employer–union agree-
ments, the sample is restricted to teachers in public schools, that is, schools owned and operated by either municipali-
ties or counties.
The sample consists of observations of teachers employed in August at the start of school years t and (t − 1). We
identified 15,985 individuals in the relevant cohorts and school years who met the criteria outlined above. After
dropping 406 individuals who were not present in both years, the final sample included 15,579 teachers, comprising a
treatment group of 2,449 men and 4,860 women born 1952–1958 and a control group of 2,650 men and 5,620 women
born 1953–1959.
4.4 | Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics at the beginning of the school year before treatment. Except for month of birth, the
treatment and control groups are similar with respect to marital status, nationality, education, school level, and labour
supply. We note that at pretreatment, women have more sickdays and sick notes than men. There are also relatively
more part-time workers among women. For men, sickness absence (days and notes) is higher in the treatment group
than in the control group, and they have more GP consultations because of mental health problems than men in the
control group. There are no such differences for women. Figures 1 and 2 show monthly data on sickdays and sick notes
before aggregation into yearly averages. There is seasonal variation, but we also see that treated men have more absence
than the untreated in t – 1, as reported in Table 1. Even though the treated sample is older at baseline, this difference is
somewhat unexpected, as the treatment group is not selected on any other criteria than date of birth. Figures S1–S4 in
TABLE 1 Summary statistics at baseline
Description
Men Women
Controls Treated Controls Treated
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Female
Month of birth 3.575 1.660 9.468 1.744 3.568 1.682 9.416 1.711
Norwegian born 0.944 0.954 0.952 0.948
Education level
Upper secondary 0.025 0.032 0.004 0.003
Bachelor 0.789 0.801 0.905 0.897
Master or more 0.186 0.167 0.091 0.101
School level
Compulsory 0.494 0.500 0.785 0.770
Upper secondary 0.506 0.500 0.215 0.230
Labour supply
Full time 0.844 0.838 0.751 0.750
Part time 0.156 0.162 0.249 0.250
Hours/week 34.820 6.637 34.777 6.856 33.016 7.223 33.172 7.143
Outcomesa
Sickdays/month 1.272 4.257 1.683 5.217 2.084 5.478 2.101 5.537
Sick notes 0.606 1.689 0.718 1.914 1.041 2.201 1.032 2.177
GP visits 1.913 2.695 2.034 2.802 2.652 2.993 2.677 2.927
GP visits (P)b 0.414 1.875 0.579 2.671 0.658 2.293 0.693 2.375
GP visits, (L)b 0.798 2.116 0.795 2.265 1.172 2.677 1.214 2.653
GP visits, (K)b 0.592 1.906 0.683 2.268 0.436 1.514 0.409 1.442
N 2,650 2,449 5,620 4,860
Note. Treatment cohorts are born July–December 1952–1958; control cohorts are born January–June 1953–1959.
Abbreviations: GP, general practitioner; SD, standard deviation.
aExcept for sickdays, all outcomes relate to a school year (10-month period).
b(P): psychiatric diagnosis, (L): musculoskeletal diagnosis, (K): cardiovascular diagnosis (chapters P, L, and K in the ICPC-2 codebook).
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the online appendix show plots according to Figure 1 and 2 broken down by year, and it does not appear that this pat-
tern is driven by specific years or birth cohorts. In the empirical analysis, where we estimate the outcomes separately
for men and women, the DD design takes care of any pretreatment differences in outcome levels between the treatment
and control groups. The outcome pattern of men shows that it is important to probe the common trend assumption.
We also explore whether results are driven by outcome patterns in particular years.
5 | RESULTS
5.1 | Main results
Table 2 presents the main DD results. In addition to the treatment effect, we report estimates for the posttreatment
effect (δ and β1 in Equation [(2)], respectively). We also report estimates from a separate regression testing whether
FIGURE 1 Mean number of
sickdays per month, by treatment status
and gender [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 2 Mean number of sick
notes per month, by treatment status
and gender [Colour figure can be viewed
at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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pretreatment differences are statistically significant. Overall, the estimates do not reach statistical significance at 5%
level. For women, all estimates are far from statistical significance. However, there is indication of an effect for men:
the estimated effect on monthly sickdays is −0.31, with a p value of.06. For sick notes per year, the estimate is −0.092
(p = .10). The effect on GP visits due to mental health problems is −0.105, at a similar precision level. The (imprecisely
estimated) effect on sickdays is quite large: a 21% reduction from the average 1.47. The effect on the closely related out-
come sick notes is also large, amounting to a 14% reduction, which makes sense, as a sickness certification may vary in
length. The fact that the two measures of sickness absence come from different sources, but point in the same direction,
adds credibility to the interpretation of a decrease in sickness absence among men. There are also (statistically weak)
indications that lower workload causes a reduction in GP visits for psychological issues. In comparison, the estimate of
β1, the aging effect, is much smaller in magnitude and not statistically significant in any of these estimations.
Next, we explore heterogeneity along several dimensions in addition to gender: previous health status, school level,
and hours worked.
In Table 3, the sample is split according to previous health status, proxied by the number of GP visits 2 years before
treatment. The majority have no or one visit, and it is not obvious where to cut the sample. Therefore, we report results
where the sample is split at the 8th, 9th, and 10th gender-wise decile of visits.
The results clearly indicate that the effects, where found, are driven by teachers with a history of previous poor
health. In the 70/30 split, the effects on sick notes and sick days are statistically significant for the “poor health” group
of men, and the finding on mental health visits remain. The effects are large compared with the sample means at base-
line, suggesting an average reduction of about 40%. However, even in this subgroup, the majority has little absence, so
most of the action is among those who have more than average absence. In the “healthy” group, there are no effects.
For the other cuts, the point estimates for the poor health subgroup are similar but less precisely estimated. The larger
standard errors are probably a mechanical effect of smaller sample sizes. Interestingly, we now also estimate a negative
effect on visits due to cardiovascular problems for women in the “unhealthy” group (in the 70/30 and 80/20 splits).
Heterogeneity by school level and hours worked are reported in Appendix Tables S1 and S2. In short, the estimates
are more imprecise than in the main analysis, and no clear inferences can be made, even though the results on sickdays
for men go in the same direction.
TABLE 2 Effects of work load reduction, full sample. Difference-in-difference estimates with individual fixed effects
Outcomes:
Men Women
Estimates Sample mean at baseline Estimates Sample mean at baseline
Sickdays Treatment effect −0.311 (0.163) 1.470 0.075 (0.137) 2.092
Posttreatment 0.016 (0.103) −0.014 (0.092)
Pretreatment diff. 0.294 (0.277) 0.194 (0.214)
Sick notes Treatment effect −0.092 (0.056) 0.660 0.031 (0.051) 1.037
Posttreatment 0.023 (0.038) −0.002 (0.035)
Pretreatment diff. 0.092 (0.109) 0.100 (0.088)
GP visits Treatment effect 0.009 (0.077) 1.971 −0.023 (0.058) 2.663
Posttreatment 0.110* (0.053) 0.007 (0.040)
Pretreatment diff. 0.070 (0.180) 0.135 (0.122)
GP visits,
P diagnosis
Treatment effect −0.104 (0.063) 0.493 0.028 (0.048) 0.674
Posttreatment 0.043 (0.040) 0.013 (0.034)
Pretreatment diff. 0.190 (0.118) 0.058 (0.103)
GP visits,
L diagnoses
Treatment effect −0.024 (0.064) 0.797 0.007 (0.057) 1.191
Post treatment 0.030 (0.046) 0.057 (0.039)
Pretreatment diff. 0.127 (0.129) 0.079 (0.105)
GP visits,
K diagnoses
Treatment effect 0.084 (0.064) 0.636 −0.020 (0.030) 0.423
Post treatment 0.070 (0.039) 0.038 (0.021)
Pretreatment diff. −0.103 (0.135) −0.003 (0.066)
Observations 10198 20960
Note. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Treatment cohorts are born July–December 1952–1958; control cohorts are born January–
June 1953–1959. For all outcomes, time and treatment effects are estimated with individual fixed effects and controls for school year. In separate regressions,
we test whether pretreatment means differ statistically, when controls for school year and month of birth are included.
Abbreviations: diff., difference; GP, general practitioner
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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5.2 | Placebo test
The results thus far indicate a favourable treatment effect on male teachers' sickness absence and psychological health,
with negative estimates. However, this finding may be spurious if the assumption of a common trend is violated. As
one check of the identifying assumption, we perform a placebo test. Here, “treatment” is 1 year earlier, that is, in the
school year when “treated” teachers all have turned 54 before the autumn semester ends. Given that, in reality, there is
no treatment at that age, we would not expect to find negative coefficient estimates of any statistical power on the pla-
cebo treatment. Table 4 details the placebo results and confirms our expectation. None of the coefficients for sick days,
sick notes, or GP visits for mental health issues are statistically significant, and some of the point estimates have the
“wrong sign,” including a statistically significant positive effect on one diagnosis variable for men. Because the
“treated” group is older than the “control” group, one possible explanation for positive estimates could be an aging
effect that our design does not fully control for. If such an effect exists, it would lead to an underestimation of the true
treatment effect. We conclude that the placebo tests provide no evidence calling into question the main results.
5.3 | Extending the pretreatment period
With more than one observation before treatment, it is possible to ease the common trend assumption by including
group specific trends in the model. Table 5 reports results from the extended model for sickdays and sick notes, where
we have added two extra lags. Because our data on sick notes is available from 2006 onwards, the extension is only pos-
sible for treatment/control cohorts 1954/55–1958/59. Our data for sickdays goes further back, so we can do this analysis
for the same cohorts as in Table 2. The results are consistent with the main results, with a negative and larger effect on
sickdays, whereas the effect on sick notes is still imprecisely estimated. In conclusion, this additional analysis supports
the main results.
TABLE 4 Placebo treatment, full sample. Difference-in-difference estimates with individual fixed effects
Outcomes Men Women
Sickdays 0.306 (0.183) −0.050 (0.147)
Sick notes 0.065 (0.064) −0.044 (0.055)
GP visits 0.080 (0.086) 0.034 (0.063)
GP visits, P diagnoses 0.076 (0.065) −0.034 (0.051)
GP visits, L diagnoses −0.011 (0.074) 0.023 (0.062)
GP visits, K diagnoses 0.136* (0.064) −0.011 (0.033)
N 8,202 17,572
Note. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Placebo treatment 1 year before actual treatment, that is, treatment cohorts are born
July–December 1953–1958, control cohorts are born January–June 1954–1959. For all outcomes, treatment effects are estimated with individual fixed effects
and controls for school year and time effects (posttreatment indicator).
Abbreviation: GP, general practitioner.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE 5 Effect on sickdays and sick notes. Difference-in-difference estimates with individual fixed effects, with three pretreatment
years
Sickdays Sick notes
Men Women Men Women
Trend −0.078 (0.174) −0.077 (0.172) 0.000 (0.027) 0.038 (0.024)
Trend×treated 0.161 (0.084) 0.032 (0.071) 0.043 (0.037) −0.024 (0.032)
Treatment year 0.024 (0.140) −0.015 (0.124) 0.043 (0.064) −0.038 (0.058)
Treatment effect −0.449* (0.212) 0.052 (0.178) −0.161 (0.094) 0.066 (0.080)
Observations 20,224 41,629 12,793 28,201
Note. Standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses. Sickdays: treatment cohorts are born July–December 1952–1958, control cohorts are born
January–June 1953–1959. Sick notes: treatment cohorts are born July–December 1954–1958, control cohorts are born January–June 1955–1959.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Even though Figures S1–S4 in the online appendix did not reveal any clear patterns in absence and sick notes across
treatment years (confer Section 4.4), we investigated the sensitivity of our results to dropping particular years from the
analysis. If the results are driven by individual outliers or macro effects that are not picked up by the year fixed effects,
we would expect that to show up here. Figures S5–S8 (analysis with one pretreatment observation) and S9–S12 (three
pretreatment observations) in the online Appendix reveal no systematic changes in the estimates. Comparing to the
main results in Table 2, we see that the point estimate on sickdays for men (−0.31 in Table 2) is consistently below −0.2
but with large confidence intervals, and the sick notes estimate (−0.092 in Table 2) is always below −0.07.
6 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The contributions of this analysis are twofold. First, we investigate a research question that is important but seldom
analysed, namely the effect of policy initiatives aimed at improving job conditions for older workers, in this case, an
age-dependent reduction in workload. Second, to estimate the causal impact of workload on the labour supply of
older employees, we utilize a setting where workload varies by employee's month of birth, which is exogenous with
respect to both the employer and employees. This initiative has not been evaluated before. The estimated effect is an
intention-to-treat effect because we cannot observe whether the individual employee makes use of the option. The
initiative evaluated is modest, but—if there is any impact at all—we expect it to have favourable effects on health and
sickness absence.
Our main result is that the workload reduction causes a decrease in sickness absence among males, and there are
indications that this is from less psychological strain. We support these results with a placebo test. The effects for men
are of large magnitude; a reduction in sick days and sick notes of 21 and 14%, respectively, albeit imprecisely estimated.
If there exists another treatment other than the workload reduction offered to employees at the age of 55, it would bias
the results. However, we know of no such treatment. Although a relevant concern could be that the results for men to
some extent hinge on the higher absence level in the treated relative to the control group before treatment, the sensitiv-
ity analysis does not indicate that this difference is due to idiosyncrasies related to particular years or birth cohorts.
Our analysis has detected large heterogeneity in the response to workload reduction among different subgroups.
The results for men are driven by male teachers whose prior health status is poor, that is, their number of GP visits in
the pretreatment year is in the highest 30%. We find this to be an interesting result, showing that for these men, even a
modest workload reduction has an impact on sickness absence and health. Among women, there are no clear effects,
except a reduction in number of GP visits for K diagnoses for women in the poorest health group.
Differences in job characteristics do not easily explain the difference in effect estimates between men and women
because we compare employees within the same occupation. Our finding that male and female employees react differ-
ently to institutional changes is then in line with previous research. Not only are women's sickness absence levels
higher than men's (see, for instance, Markussen et al., 2011), but more importantly, women also appear less responsive
to workplace changes. Elsewhere, these include negative organizational shocks/change in job security (Bratberg &
Monstad, 2015; Ichino & Riphahn, 2005); their absenteeism reacts differently to social security reform (Johansson &
Palme, 2005), and their labour supply responses to a negative health shock are different from those of men (Trevisan &
Zantomio, 2016). In general, this gender difference could arise from differences in options or preferences, possibly
shaped by gender roles. Finally, we note that women are much more likely to work part-time than men at baseline, as
Table 1 shows. This allocation might be health-related, indicating that women who are still employed at the age of
about 53–54 to a greater extent than same-age men have adjusted to the work strain by reducing weekly hours worked.
If so, effect estimates for women will be biased downwards.
Some caveats are in place. When six outcomes are considered, like in the present analysis, a possible concern is that
testing several hypotheses increases the probability of Type I errors, that is, falsely rejecting a null hypothesis of no
effect. A Bonferroni correction says that for rejection at a 5% significance level, the p value must be below.05/.06 = .008.
That is very conservative and increases the probability of Type II error, but still the precision of our results as reported
may be too optimistic.
On the other hand, the initiative may have favourable external effects that are not considered in this analysis. If
teacher health improves and sickness absence is reduced, it would benefit pupils' learning and colleagues who do not
need to step in as locums. Our results show a decrease in long-term sickness absence, there might be a decrease in
sickness absence spells shorter than 16 days, as well. Also, we study employees at ages 53–55 and use a narrow time
window to trace the causal effect, which relates to the first 10 months after the start of treatment. Because of the nature
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of the intervention, we cannot conclude with respect to later outcomes such as retirement age, the uptake of disability
pension, or health status. However, we find it worth mentioning that in Norway, disability pension is typically preceded
by long-term sickness absence. This adds relevance to our finding that the workload reduction particularly impacts on
the sickness absence of men of poor health, who probably are most vulnerable to health-related labour market exit.
Despite the fact that the reduction in workload studied is modest and affects only part of the work duties of a
teacher (those directly related to classroom teaching), we identify a strong effect among men. Nonetheless, it is
noteworthy that men given less workload appear to have improved their health in the sense that consultations due to
mental health problems are less frequent, with fewer days of certified sick leave and sick notes issued less often.
Overall, our results suggest that preventive measures taken to retain older workers can indeed have a favourable
effect on their sickness absence and health. A cost–benefit analysis of this initiative is beyond the scope of this paper.
Still, if we consider only two of the elements relevant for such an analysis, a back-of-the-envelope calculation would be
that the value of less sickness absence among men (a reduction of 21% in the use of locums, for one third of the teacher
sample) more than outweighs the extra wage costs that the workload reduction generates (an increase of 5.8% for the
whole sample). However, there is a need for caution as preventive measures such as the workload reduction studied
make older workers costlier and thus may yield them a competitive disadvantage in the labour market. Moreover, the
large heterogeneity in the response to workload reduction at age 55 calls into question whether work life regulations
should be targeted to those who benefit the most instead of towards all employees within the age group. However, such
differentiation is difficult to implement.
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